Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement
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Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement
EN HC NWISBN: 9780521514811 bzw. 0521514819, in Englisch, Cambridge University Press, gebundenes Buch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Versandkosten nach: USA.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, BuySomeBooks.
Cambridge University Press. Hardcover. New. Hardcover. 228 pages. Dimensions: 9.1in. x 6.2in. x 0.9in.Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current members might lose from their accession Combining political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses, Christina J. Schneider argues that the dominant theories of EU enlargement ignore how EU members and applicant states negotiate the distribution of enlargement benefits and costs. She explains that EU enlargement happens despite distributional conflicts if the overall gains of enlargement are redistributed from the relative winners among existing members and applicants to the relative losers. If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently great, a redistribution of these gains will compensate losers, making enlargement attractive for all states. This item ships from multiple locations. Your book may arrive from Roseburg,OR, La Vergne,TN.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, BuySomeBooks.
Cambridge University Press. Hardcover. New. Hardcover. 228 pages. Dimensions: 9.1in. x 6.2in. x 0.9in.Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current members might lose from their accession Combining political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses, Christina J. Schneider argues that the dominant theories of EU enlargement ignore how EU members and applicant states negotiate the distribution of enlargement benefits and costs. She explains that EU enlargement happens despite distributional conflicts if the overall gains of enlargement are redistributed from the relative winners among existing members and applicants to the relative losers. If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently great, a redistribution of these gains will compensate losers, making enlargement attractive for all states. This item ships from multiple locations. Your book may arrive from Roseburg,OR, La Vergne,TN.
2
Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement, Accession Negotiations, Distributional Conflicts, and Discriminatory Membership (2008)
EN HC NWISBN: 9780521514811 bzw. 0521514819, in Englisch, Cambridge University Press, gebundenes Buch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Niederlande, Vermoedelijk 4-6 weken.
bol.com.
Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current members might lose from their accession? Combining political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses, Christina J. Schneider argues... Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current members might lose from their accession? Combining political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses, Christina J. Schneider argues that the dominant theories of EU enlargement ignore how EU members and applicant states negotiate the distribution of enlargement benefits and costs. She explains that EU enlargement happens despite distributional conflicts if the overall gains of enlargement are redistributed from the relative winners among existing members and applicants to the relative losers. If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently great, a redistribution of these gains will compensate losers, making enlargement attractive for all states.Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 17x228x152 mm;Gewicht: 510,00 gram;Verschijningsdatum: december 2008;ISBN10: 0521514819;ISBN13: 9780521514811; Engelstalig | Hardcover | 2008.
bol.com.
Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current members might lose from their accession? Combining political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses, Christina J. Schneider argues... Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current members might lose from their accession? Combining political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses, Christina J. Schneider argues that the dominant theories of EU enlargement ignore how EU members and applicant states negotiate the distribution of enlargement benefits and costs. She explains that EU enlargement happens despite distributional conflicts if the overall gains of enlargement are redistributed from the relative winners among existing members and applicants to the relative losers. If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently great, a redistribution of these gains will compensate losers, making enlargement attractive for all states.Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 17x228x152 mm;Gewicht: 510,00 gram;Verschijningsdatum: december 2008;ISBN10: 0521514819;ISBN13: 9780521514811; Engelstalig | Hardcover | 2008.
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Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement (2008)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9780511460227 bzw. 0511460228, in Englisch, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Frankreich, in-stock.
Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current members might lose from their accession? Combining political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses, Christina J. Schneider argues that the dominant theories of EU enlargement ignore how EU members and applicant states negotiate the distribution of enlargement benefits and costs. She explains that EU enlargement happens despite distributional conflicts if the overall gains of enlargement are redistributed from the relative winners among existing members and applicants to the relative losers. If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently great, a redistribution of these gains will compensate losers, making enlargement attractive for all states.
Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current members might lose from their accession? Combining political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses, Christina J. Schneider argues that the dominant theories of EU enlargement ignore how EU members and applicant states negotiate the distribution of enlargement benefits and costs. She explains that EU enlargement happens despite distributional conflicts if the overall gains of enlargement are redistributed from the relative winners among existing members and applicants to the relative losers. If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently great, a redistribution of these gains will compensate losers, making enlargement attractive for all states.
4
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Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement (2009)
EN HCISBN: 9780521514811 bzw. 0521514819, in Englisch, Cambridge University Press, gebundenes Buch.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Versandkosten nach: USA.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Ergodebooks.
Cambridge University Press, 2009-01-19. 1. Hardcover. Used:Good. Buy with confidence. Excellent Customer Service & Return policy. Ships Fast. Expedite Shipping Available.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Ergodebooks.
Cambridge University Press, 2009-01-19. 1. Hardcover. Used:Good. Buy with confidence. Excellent Customer Service & Return policy. Ships Fast. Expedite Shipping Available.
5
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Conflict, Negotiation And European Union Enlargement
EN HC NWISBN: 9780521514811 bzw. 0521514819, in Englisch, Cambridge University Press, gebundenes Buch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Indien, Versandkosten nach: USA.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Classic Books.
Cambridge University Press, 2,008. Hardcover. New. Fast Shipping!!! Customer Satisfaction Comes First. Usually 4-10 Days For Delivery. 100% Money Back Guaranteed!!
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Classic Books.
Cambridge University Press, 2,008. Hardcover. New. Fast Shipping!!! Customer Satisfaction Comes First. Usually 4-10 Days For Delivery. 100% Money Back Guaranteed!!
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CONFLICT NEGOTIATION AND EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT
EN NWISBN: 9780521514811 bzw. 0521514819, in Englisch, Cambridge University Press, Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, neu.
Lieferung aus: Indien, Versandkosten nach: USA.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Students_Textbooks.
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Students_Textbooks.
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
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