Election Timing (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
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Election Timing (Paperback) (2009)
EN PB NW RPISBN: 9780521108317 bzw. 0521108314, in Englisch, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, United Kingdom, Taschenbuch, neu, Nachdruck.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, Versandkostenfrei.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, The Book Depository [54837791], London, United Kingdom.
Language: English . Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****.Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections when the time is right . The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. In particular, he argues that, if all else is equal, leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in their future performance. As a consequence, early elections signal a leader s lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, the author tests hypotheses related to timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. Leaders who call elections early (relative to expectations) experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels, experience worse post-electoral performance, and have shorter campaigns.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, The Book Depository [54837791], London, United Kingdom.
Language: English . Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****.Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections when the time is right . The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. In particular, he argues that, if all else is equal, leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in their future performance. As a consequence, early elections signal a leader s lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, the author tests hypotheses related to timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. Leaders who call elections early (relative to expectations) experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels, experience worse post-electoral performance, and have shorter campaigns.
2
Election Timing (2009)
EN PB NWISBN: 9780521108317 bzw. 0521108314, in Englisch, Cambridge University Press, Taschenbuch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Niederlande, Vermoedelijk 4-6 weken.
bol.com.
Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections 'when the time is right'. The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. In particular, he argues that, if all else is equal, leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in their future performance. As a consequence, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earl... Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections 'when the time is right'. The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. In particular, he argues that, if all else is equal, leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in their future performance. As a consequence, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, the author tests hypotheses related to timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. Leaders who call elections early (relative to expectations) experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels, experience worse post-electoral performance, and have shorter campaigns.Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 16x229x152 mm;Gewicht: 430,00 gram;Verschijningsdatum: april 2009;ISBN10: 0521108314;ISBN13: 9780521108317; Engelstalig | Paperback | 2009.
bol.com.
Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections 'when the time is right'. The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. In particular, he argues that, if all else is equal, leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in their future performance. As a consequence, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earl... Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections 'when the time is right'. The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. In particular, he argues that, if all else is equal, leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in their future performance. As a consequence, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, the author tests hypotheses related to timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. Leaders who call elections early (relative to expectations) experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels, experience worse post-electoral performance, and have shorter campaigns.Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 16x229x152 mm;Gewicht: 430,00 gram;Verschijningsdatum: april 2009;ISBN10: 0521108314;ISBN13: 9780521108317; Engelstalig | Paperback | 2009.
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Election Timing (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (2009)
EN PBISBN: 9780521108317 bzw. 0521108314, in Englisch, Cambridge University Press, Taschenbuch.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Versandkosten nach: USA.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Ergodebooks.
Cambridge University Press, 2009-04-09. Paperback. Used:Good. Buy with confidence. Excellent Customer Service & Return policy. Ships Fast. Expedite Shipping Available.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Ergodebooks.
Cambridge University Press, 2009-04-09. Paperback. Used:Good. Buy with confidence. Excellent Customer Service & Return policy. Ships Fast. Expedite Shipping Available.
4
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Election Timing
EN PB NWISBN: 9780521108317 bzw. 0521108314, in Englisch, Cambridge University Press, Taschenbuch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, zzgl. Versandkosten, Verandgebiet: EUR.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Paperbackshop International, GLOS, Fairford, [RE:4].
Softcover.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Paperbackshop International, GLOS, Fairford, [RE:4].
Softcover.
5
Symbolbild
Election Timing (2009)
EN PB NWISBN: 9780521108317 bzw. 0521108314, in Englisch, Cambridge University Press, Taschenbuch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, zzgl. Versandkosten, Verandgebiet: EUR.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Herb Tandree Philosophy Books, Stroud, Glos, [RE:4].
Paperback.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Herb Tandree Philosophy Books, Stroud, Glos, [RE:4].
Paperback.
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