The Economics of Informal Financial Arrangements - The Characteristics of Informal Institutions and the Senegalese Experience (engl.)
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The goal of this paper is to explain the economics of informal financial arrangements, the reasons for their failure and success, and to prove that some forms of collective action and interlinked transactions can form a satis¬factory market solution in the asymmetric information environment of de¬veloping economies. Inspired by the New Institutional Economics literature, the focus here is upon the Transaction and Information Cost Approaches, and on the Theory of Col¬lective Action and Collective Bargains. Incorporating the work of Dale Adams, the conclusion is reached that the best way to analyze informal finance is to analyze the structure and nature of contracts within it. Following this proposi¬tion, the nature of the credit contract will be discussed in detail. Game-theoretical solutions are the main theoretical background for the cor-responding institutional solutions, particularly in a world with asymmetric in-formation and, consequently, adapted forms of contracting. The main propo¬sitions are that collective action and interlinked transactions can be the domi¬nant bylaws of a contract that can transform a set of uncertain games into a secured supergame and institution.

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Von Händler/Antiquariat, josef-eul-verlag.
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Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Gewöhnlich versandfertig in 24 Stunden, Versandkostenfrei. Tatsächliche Versandkosten können abweichen.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, ausverkauf.
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen