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HarperPress. Very Good. 153 x 234 x 15mm. Paperback. 2007. 704 pages. With an introduction read by Max Hastings. A compa nion volume to his bestselling Armageddon, Max Hastings' account of the battle for Japan is a masterful military history. Featur ing the most remarkable cast of commanders the world has ever see n, the dramatic battle for Japan of 1944-45 was acted out across the vast stage of Asia: Imphal and Kohima, Leyte Gulf and Iwo Jim a, Okinawa, and the Soviet assault on Manchuria. In this grippi ng narrative, Max Hastings weaves together the complex strands of an epic war, exploring the military tactics behind some of the m ost triumphant and most horrific scenes of the 20th century. The result is a masterpiece that balances the story of command decisi ons, rivalries, and follies with the experiences of soldiers, sai lors, and airmen of all sides as only Max Hastings can. Editoria l Reviews Review [A] masterly account of the climax of the conf lict against Japan. . . . Hastings is a military historian in the grand tradition. --The New York Times Book Review Compelling. . . . To the broad sweep of military events Hastings adds myriad h uman stories . . . and he does not hesitate to offer his own keen analysis along the way. --The Wall Street Journal Through the i maginative power of his writing, we get an inkling . . . of what it must have been like to slog one's way up a cliff at Iwo Jima, or be firebombed in Tokyo. --The New York Review of Books A triu mph. . . . The key to the book's success lies not in its accessib ility, nor in its vivid portraits of the key figures in the drama --although it has both--but in something else entirely: the autho r's supremely confident ambition. --The Sunday Times (London) Ha stings has another winner. . . . This book is first-rate popular history, stiffened with a strongly stated point of view . . . A c lose-up and personal look at war as it affected real people, and how it felt to them at the time. --Harry Levins, St. Louis Post-D ispatch Explosive, argumentative, intensely researched. . . . De mands to be read. A book of stunning disclosures. --Tom Mackin, S unday Star-Ledger [A] masterful interpretive narrative. . . . Ha stings is both comprehensive and finely acute. --Booklist Specta cular . . . Searingly powerful. Hastings makes important points a bout the war in the East that have been all too rarely heard. --A ndrew Roberts, The Sunday Telegraph Extraordinary . . . Anyone w ho believes that we're all living through a uniquely troubled tim e should read this . . . book. --Georgie Rose, The Sunday Herald This is a book not only for military history buffs but for anyon e who wants to understand what happened in half the world during one of the bloodiest periods of the blood-soaked 20th century. -- The Spectator Highly readable . . . An admirably balanced re-exa mination of the last phases of a conflict that it is not fashiona ble to remember. --Dan van der Vat, The Guardian Engrossing. . . . Its originality lies in the meticulousness of the author's res earch and the amazing witnesses he has found. --Murray Sayle, The Evening Standard Hastings is . . . a master of the sort of deta il that illuminates the human cost. It is the way he leaps so ade ptly to and fro between the vast panorama and the tiny snapshot p ictures that makes him such a readable historian. --Mail on Sunda y --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title. From The Washington Post Reviewed by Kai Bird The British military historian Max Hastings is best known for volume s that insist on recounting World War II from the bottom up. Hast ings wants his readers to learn history from the perspective of t he army grunts, sailors and airmen who endured the tedium and bar barity of war. His is military history as told from the foxhole - - or, in the case of this narrative of the last year of the Pacif ic war, as told from the decks of aircraft carriers. Too often the little actors in history are forgotten in the shadows of the kings, presidents and generals who send them into battle. In Retr ibution, Hastings does not leave out the big actors, but what is new and original are the personal stories he has extracted from o ral histories and his own interviews with veterans of the America n, Japanese, Russian, Australian and even Chinese armies. A fine writer, Hastings conveys many heartrending testimonies. He quotes a sailor describing his friend's decapitation during a kamikaze raid: His head fell off at my feet. I looked down . . . and I bel ieve his mouth was still trying to tell me something. A Japanese soldier observes his starving men cooking the remains of a dead o fficer. A Marine on Iwo Jima comes across piles of dead Marines, waiting to be collected. Hastings's veterans recount numerous f irefights, ambushes, massacres and rapes. War crimes are committe d by all sides -- but most methodically by the Japanese. When Gen . Douglas MacArthur refuses to bombard Manila's old Spanish distr ict, one of his officers complains: War is never pretty. I am fra nk to say I would sacrifice Philipino [sic] lives under such circ umstances to save the lives of my men. I feel quite bitter about this tonight. Hastings draws an array of lessons from these sto ries. He concludes, unarguably, that war is chaotic, arbitrary an d brutal for the people on the frontlines, and that generals ofte n make decisions that needlessly sacrifice their soldiers. He is very tough on MacArthur, criticizing many of the Pacific commande r's strategic moves, particularly his decision to waste lives and resources in seizing Manila. Describing the U.S. loss of 8,140 m en on Luzon, Hastings observes that Japanese barbarism rendered t he battle for Manila a human catastrophe, but MacArthur's obsessi on with seizing the city created the circumstances for it. . . . MacArthur presided over the largest ground campaign of America's war in the Pacific in a fashion which satisfied his own ambitions more convincingly than the national purpose of his country. Bu t when it comes to Retribution's central theme -- that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were wholly justified and nec essary to persuade a recalcitrant enemy to surrender -- Hastings abandons his critical faculties. He is not content simply to argu e that the fate which befell Japan in 1945 was retributive justic e for that country's misdeeds. In language reminiscent of the pat riotically correct criticism of the Smithsonian's attempt in 1995 to mount an exhibit about the Enola Gay, Hastings asserts, The m yth that the Japanese were ready to surrender anyway has been so comprehensively discredited by modern research that it is astonis hing some writers continue to give it credence. He calls these un named writers peddlers of fantasies. Of course, the American Le gion agrees with him. But it is an assertion rather than an argum ent, and the evidence of ongoing, robust debate is abundant. Nume rous historians continue to question one aspect or another of the standard defense of President Harry Truman's decision to use the bomb, in the words of J. Robert Oppenheimer, against an enemy th at was essentially defeated. Three years ago, the Japanese schola r Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, who teaches at the University of California, Santa Barbara, published a widely praised book, Racing the Enemy : Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan, revealing evidence f rom Japanese and Russian archives that it was the Soviet entry in to the war -- and not the atomic bombings -- that induced surrend er. But Hastings does not alert his readers to this new evidence. Let's clear the deck here: Few, if any, critics of the atomic b ombings believe that an invasion of the Japanese home islands wou ld have been preferable to the use of weapons of mass destruction . But the critics -- and Hastings -- know that this was not the r eal choice; Hastings admits that an invasion would almost certain ly have been unnecessary. The real question is whether lives coul d have been saved by following the advice of War Secretary Henry Stimson, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, the State Dep artment's Joseph Grew, Gen. George Marshall and numerous other ad visers to the president. They -- and by the way, The Washington P ost at the time -- urged Truman to clarify the terms of unconditi onal surrender by stipulating that the United States would allow Japan to retain its emperor as a constitutional monarch. There is good evidence -- even in Hastings's book -- that this might have led to an earlier surrender. But while Hastings devotes two ful l chapters to these issues, he can't find the space to note that Truman, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and Adm. William D. Le ahy, the president's chief of staff, all reportedly agreed on Aug . 3, 1945 -- three days before 140,000 civilians were killed in H iroshima -- that Japan was looking for peace. Similarly, Hastings says Byrnes advised Truman that Americans would not stand for a clarification of the terms of surrender that appeared to coddle J apan. But Hastings does not tell his readers that the Senate Repu blican leadership was publicly attacking Truman for prolonging th e war by not giving the Japanese what the State Department knew t hey wanted: a guarantee of the continuation of the emperorship. R ather, Hastings has this to say about Byrnes's judgments: If ther e was a strand of triumphalism in American conduct, why should th ere not have been? In the end, I don't quarrel with many of the facts in this book. But I am appalled by the critical evidence l eft out. This is both unfortunate and unnecessary because Hasting s's narrative is fully compatible with a more nuanced interpretat ion of how the Pacific war ended. He amply demonstrates, for inst ance, that the Japanese were essentially defeated before the atom ic bombs fell. But the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain a hot-button issue, something that can make otherwise responsible historians nose-dive into polemics. Copyright 2008, The Washin gton Post. All Rights Reserved. --This text refers to an out of p rint or unavailable edition of this title. Excerpt. ® Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved. Dilemmas and Decisions 1. Wa r in the East Our understanding of the events of 1939-45 might b e improved by adding a plural and calling them the Second World W ars. The only common strand in the struggles which Germany and Ja pan unleashed was that they chose most of the same adversaries. T he only important people who sought to conduct the eastern and we stern conflicts as a unified enterprise were Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and their respective chiefs of staff. After the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor caused the Unite d States to become a belligerent, Allied warlords addressed the v exed issue of allocating resources to rival theatres. Germany was by far the Allies' more dangerous enemy, while Japan was the foc us of greater American animus. In 1942, at the battles of the Cor al Sea in May and Midway a month later, the U.S. Navy won victori es which halted the Japanese advance across the Pacific, and remo ved the danger that Australia might be invaded. Through the two years which followed, America's navy grew in strength, while her Marines and soldiers slowly and painfully expelled the Japanese f rom the island strongholds which they had seized. But President R oosevelt and Gen. George Marshall, chairman of the joint chiefs o f staff, resisted the demands of Admiral Ernest King, the U.S. Na vy's C-in-C, and of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander in the south-west Pacific, for the eastern theatre to become the pri ncipal focus of America's war effort. In 1943 and 1944, America's vast industrial mobilisation made it possible to send large forc es of warships and planes east as well as west. Most U.S. ground troops, however, were dispatched across the Atlantic, to fight th e Germans. Once Japan's onslaught was checked, the Allies' easter n commanders were given enough forces progressively to push back the enemy, but insufficient to pursue a swift victory. The second -class status of the Japanese war was a source of resentment to t hose who had to fight it, but represented strategic wisdom. The U.S. and Britain dispatched separate companies to Europe and Asia , to perform in different plays. Stalin, meanwhile, was intereste d in the conflict with Japan only insofar as it might offer oppor tunities to amass booty. The Russians may be expected to move aga inst the Japanese when it suits their pleasure, suggested an Amer ican diplomat in an October 1943 memorandum to the State Departme nt, which may not be until the final phases of the war-and then o nly in order to be able to participate in dictating terms to the Japanese and to establish new strategic frontiers. Until 8 August 1945, Soviet neutrality in the east was so scrupulously preserve d that American B-29s which forced-landed on Russian territory ha d to stay there, not least to enable their hosts to copy the desi gn. To soldiers, sailors and airmen, any battlefield beyond thei r own compass seemed remote. What was happening in Europe really didn't matter to us, said Lt. John Cameron-Hayes of 23rd Indian M ountain Artillery, fighting in Burma. More surprising was the fai lure of Germany and Japan to coordinate their war efforts, even t o the limited extent that geographical separation might have perm itted. These two nominal allies, whose fortunes became conjoined in December 1941, conducted operations in almost absolute isolati on from each other. Hitler had no wish for Asians to meddle in hi s Aryan war. Indeed, despite Himmler's best efforts to prove that Japanese possessed some Aryan blood, he remained embarrassed by the association of the Nazi cause with Untermenschen. He received the Japanese ambassador in Berlin twice after Pearl Harbor, then not for a year. When Tokyo in 1942 proposed an assault on Madaga scar, the German navy opposed any infringement of the two allies' agreed spheres of operations, divided at 70 degrees of longitude . A Japanese assault on the Soviet Union in 1941-42, taking the Russians in the rear as they struggled to stem Hitler's invasion, might have yielded important rewards for the Axis. Stalin was te rrified of such an eventuality. The July 1941 oil embargo and ass et freeze imposed by the U.S. on Japan-Roosevelt's clumsiest dipl omatic act in the months before Pearl Harbor-was partly designed to deter Tokyo from joining Hitler's Operation Barbarossa. Japan' s bellicose foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, resigned in the sa me month because his government rejected his urgings to do so. O nly in January 1943, towards the end of the disaster of Stalingra d, did Hitler made a belated and unsuccessful attempt to persuade Japan to join his Russian war. By then, the moment had passed at which such an intervention might have altered history. Germany's Asian ally was far too heavily committed in the Pacific, South-E ast Asia and China, gratuitously to engage a new adversary. So pe rfunctory was Berlin's relationship with Tokyo that when Hitler g ifted to his ally two state- of-the-art U-boats for reproduction, German manufacturers complained about breaches of their patent r ights. One of Japan's most serious deficiencies in 1944-45 was la ck of a portable anti-tank weapon, but no attempt was made to cop y the cheap and excellent German Panzerfaust. Japan and Germany were alike fascistic states. Michael Howard has written: Both [na tions'] programmes were fuelled by a militarist ideology that rej ected the bourgeois liberalism of the capitalist West and glorifi ed war as the inevitable and necessary destiny of mankind. The co mmon German and Japanese commitment to making war for its own sak e provides the best reason for rejecting pleas in mitigation of e ither nation's conduct. The two Axis partners, however, pursued u nrelated ambitions. The only obvious manifestation of shared inte rest was that Japanese planning was rooted in an assumption of Ge rman victory. Like Italy in June 1940, Japan in December 1941 dec ided that the old colonial powers' difficulties in Europe exposed their remoter properties to rapine. Japan sought to seize access to vital oil and raw materials, together with space for mass mig ration from the home islands. A U.S. historian has written of Ja pan's Daitoa Senso, Greater East Asian War: Japan did not invade independent countries in southern Asia. It invaded colonial outpo sts which Westerners had dominated for generations, taking absolu tely for granted their racial and cultural superiority over their Asian subjects. This is true as far as it goes. Yet Japan's seiz ures of British, Dutch, French and American possessions must sure ly be seen in the context of its earlier aggression in China, whe re for a decade its armies had flaunted their ruthlessness toward s fellow Asians. After seizing Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese in 1937 began their piecemeal pillage of China, which continued unt il 1945. Inaugurating its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere , Japan perceived itself merely as a latecomer to the contests fo r empire in which other great nations had engaged for centuries. It saw only hypocrisy and racism in the objections of Western imp erial powers to its bid to match their own generous interpretatio ns of what constituted legitimate overseas interests. Such a view was not completely baseless. Japan's pre-war economic difficulti es and pretensions to a policy of Asia for Asians inspired some s ympathy among subject peoples of the European empires. This vanis hed, however, in the face of the occupiers' behaviour in China an d elsewhere. Japanese pogroms of Chinese in South-East Asia were designed partly to win favour with indigenous peoples, but these in turn soon found themselves suffering appallingly. The new rule rs were inhibited from treating their conquests humanely, even ha d they wished to do so, by the fact that the purpose of seizure w as to strip them of food and raw materials for the benefit of Jap an's people. Western audiences have been told much since 1945 abo ut Japanese wartime inhumanity to British, Americans and Australi ans who fell into their hands. This pales into absolute insignifi cance beside the scale of their mistreatment of Asians. It is a fascinating speculation, how events might have evolved if the U.S . and its Philippines dependency had been excluded from Japanese war plans in December 1941; had Tokyo confined itself to occupyin g British Malaya and Burma, along with the Dutch East Indies. Roo sevelt would certainly have wished to confront Japanese aggressio n and enter the war-the oil embargo imposed by the U.S. following Japan's advance into Indochina was the tipping factor in decidin g Tokyo to fight the Western powers. It remains a moot point, how ever, whether Congress and public sentiment would have allowed th e president to declare war in the absence of a direct assault on American national interests or the subsequent German declaration of war on the U.S. There was once a popular delusion that Japan' s attack smashed the American Pacific Fleet. In truth, however, t he six old battleships disabled at Pearl Harbor-all but one was s ubsequently restored for war service by brilliantly ingenious rep air techniques-mattered much less to the balance of forces than t he four American aircraft carriers, oil stocks and dockyard facil ities which escaped. Japan paid a wholly disproportionate moral p rice for a modest, if spectacular, tactical success. The Day of I nfamy roused the American people as no lesser provocation could h ave done. The operation must thus be judged a failure, rendering hollow the exultation of the Imperial Navy's fliers as they lande d back on their carriers on 7 December 1941. Thereafter, American s were united in determination to avenge themselves on the treach erous Asians who had assaulted a peace-loving people. The only i mportant strategic judgement which the Japanese got right was tha t their fate hinged upon that of Hitler. German victory was the s ole eventuality which might have saved Japan from the consequence s of assaulting powers vastly superior to itself in military and industrial potential. Col. Masanobu Tsuji, architect of the Japan ese army's capture of Singapore and a fanatical advocate of natio nal expansion, said: We honestly believed that America, a nation of storekeepers, would not persist with a loss-making war, wherea s Japan could sustain a protracted campaign against the Anglo-Sax ons. Tokyo's greatest misjudgement of all was to perceive its ass ault as an act of policy which might be reviewed in the light of events. In December 1941 Japan gambled on a short war, swift vict ory, and acceptance of terms by the vanquished. Even in August 19 45, many Japanese leaders refused to acknowledge that the terms o f reference for the struggle ceased to be theirs to determine on the day of Pearl Harbor. It was wildly fanciful to suppose that t he consequences of military failure might be mitigated through di plomatic parley. By choosing to participate in a total war, the n ation exposed itself to total defeat. Although the loss of Hong Kong, Malaya and Burma in 1941-42 inflicted on Britain humiliatio ns to match those suffered at Japanese hands by the U.S., its peo ple cared relatively little about the Far Eastern war, a source o f dismay to British soldiers obliged to fight in it. Winston Chur chill was tormented by a desire to redeem the defeat in February 1942 of some 70,000 combat troops under British command by a forc e of 35,000 Japanese. The shame of our disaster at Singapore coul d . . . only be wiped out by our recapture of that fortress, he t old the British chiefs of staff as late as 6 July 1944, in one of his many-fortunately frustrated-attempts to allow this objective to determine eastern strategy. To the British public, however, the Asian war seemed remote. The Japanese character in the BBC's legendary ITMA radio comedy show was Hari Kari, a gabbling clown. In June 1943 the Secretary of State for India, Leo Amery, propos ed forming a committee to rouse the British public against its As ian enemies. The Minister of Information, Brendan Bracken, strong ly dissented: It is all very well to say We must educate the Bri tish public to regard the Japanese as if they were Germans, and w ar in the Pacific as if it were war in Europe. But, while the Jap anese remain many thousands of miles away, the Germans have for t hree years been only twenty miles distant from our shore and, too often, vertically overhead. Interest and feeling follow where fr iends and loved ones are fighting . . . Europe is very much a hom e concern, whereas knowledge of or interest in the Far East is sp arsely distributed in this country . . . I do not think that any committee could do much to alter the state of morale . . . The pe ople have been left under no misapprehension by the PM that it is their duty to turn and tackle Japan when the time comes . . . T hose Britons who did think about the Japanese shared American rev ulsion towards them. When reports were broadcast in early 1944 of the maltreatment of prisoners, an editorial in the Daily Mail pr oclaimed: The Japanese have proved a sub-human race . . . Let us resolve to outlaw them. When they are beaten back to their own sa vage land, let them live there in complete isolation from the res t of the world, as in a leper compound, unclean. The American his torian John Dower explains Western attitudes in racist terms. U.S . Admiral William Halsey set the tone after Pearl Harbor, asserti ng that when the war was over, Japanese will be spoken only in he ll. A U.S. War Department film promoting bond sales employed the slogan: Every War Bond Kills a Jap. An American sub-machine gun m anufacturer advertised its products as blasting big red holes in little yellow men. There was no counterpart on the European front s to the commonplace Pacific practices of drying and preserving J apanese skulls as souvenirs, and sending home to loved ones polis hed bones of enemy dead. A British brigade commander in Burma onc e declined to accept a report from the 4/1st Gurkhas about the pr oximity of Nips. Their colonel, Derek Horsford, dispatched a patr ol to gather evidence. Next day, Horsford left three Japanese hea ds, hung for convenience on a string, beside his commander's desk . The brigadier said: Never do that again. Next time, I'll take y our word for it. But those who argue that the alien appearance a nd culture of the Japanese generated unique hatred and savagery s eem to give insufficient weight to the fact that the Japanese ini tiated and institutionalised barbarism towards both civilians and prisoners. True, the Allies later responded in kind. But in an i mperfect world, it seems unrealistic to expect that any combatant in a war will grant adversaries conspicuously better treatment t han his own people receive at their hands. Years ahead of Pearl H arbor Japanese massacres of Chinese civilians were receiving worl dwide publicity. Tokyo's forces committed systemic brutalities ag ainst Allied prisoners and civilians in the Philippines, East Ind ies, Hong Kong and Malaya-for instance, the slaughter of Chinese outside Singapore in February 1942-long before the first Allied a trocity against any Japanese is recorded. The consequence of so- called Japanese fanaticism on the battlefield, of which much more later, was that Allied commanders favoured the use of extreme me thods to defeat them. As an example, the Japanese rejected the co nvention customary in Western wars, whereby if a military positio n became untenable, its defenders gave up. In August 1944, when G erman prisoners were arriving in the United States at the rate of 50,000 a month, after three years of the war only 1,990 Japanese prisoners reposed in American hands. Why, demanded Allied comman ders, should their men be obliged to risk their own lives in orde r to indulge the enemy's inhuman doctrine of mutual immolation? From the Hardcover edition. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title. About the Author Max Has tings studied at Charterhouse and Oxford and became a foreign cor respondent, reporting from more than sixty countries and eleven w ars for BBC TV and the London Evening Standard. He has won many a wards for his journalism. Among his bestselling books 'Bomber Com mand' won the Somerset Maugham Prize, and both 'Overlord' and 'Ba ttle for the Falklands' won the Yorkshire Post Book of the Year P rize. After ten years as editor and then editor-in-chief of the D aily Telegraph, he became editor of the Evening Standard in 1996. A Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, he was knighted in 2002. He now lives in Berkshire. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title. .

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Language: English . Brand New. With an introduction read by Max Hastings. A companion volume to his bestselling Armageddon, Max Hastings account of the battle for Japan is a masterful military history. Featuring the most remarkable cast of commanders the world has ever seen, the dramatic battle for Japan of 1944-45 was acted out across the vast stage of Asia: Imphal and Kohima, Leyte Gulf and Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and the Soviet assault on Manchuria. In this gripping narrative, Max Hastings weaves together the complex strands of an epic war, exploring the military tactics behind some of the most triumphant and most horrific scenes of the 20th century. The result is a masterpiece that balances the story of command decisions, rivalries, and follies with the experiences of soldiers, sailors, and airmen of all sides as only Max Hastings can.

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With an introduction read by Max Hastings. A companion volume to his bestselling Armageddon, Max Hastings' account of the battle for Japan is a masterful military history. Featuring the most remarkable cast of commanders the world has ever seen, the dramatic battle for Japan of 1944-45 was acted out across the vast stage of Asia: Imphal and Kohima, Leyte Gulf and Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and the Soviet assault on Manchuria. In this gripping narrative, Max Hastings weaves together the complex strands of an epic war, exploring the military tactics behind some of the most triumphant and most horrific scenes of the 20th century. The result is a masterpiece that balances the story of command decisions, rivalries, and follies with the experiences of soldiers, sailors, and airmen of all sides as only Max Hastings can., MP3 CD, Edition: Unabridged, Format: Audiobook, Format: MP3 Audio, Format: Unabridged, Label: Audible Studios on Brilliance Audio, Audible Studios on Brilliance Audio, Product group: Book, Published: 2016-06-14, Release date: 2016-06-14, Studio: Audible Studios on Brilliance Audio, Sales rank: 1088883.

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