Von dem Buch The American Warfare State, The Domestic Politics of Military Spending haben wir 3 gleiche oder sehr ähnliche Ausgaben identifiziert!
Falls Sie nur an einem bestimmten Exempar interessiert sind, können Sie aus der folgenden Liste jenes wählen, an dem Sie interessiert sind:
100%: Rebecca U. Thorpe: The American Warfare State, The Domestic Politics of Military Spending (ISBN: 9780226124100) 2014, University Of Chicago Press, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
100%: Rebecca U. Thorpe: The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending (ISBN: 9780226123912) University of Chicago Press, United States of America, in Englisch, Broschiert.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
89%: Thorpe, Rebecca U.: The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics Of Military Spending (ISBN: 9780226124070) 2014, University of Chicago Press, Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, in Englisch, Taschenbuch.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
The American Warfare State, The Domestic Politics of Military Spending
9 Angebote vergleichen
Bester Preis: € 21,28 (vom 10.06.2016)1
American Warfare State The Domestic Politics of Military Spending
EN USISBN: 9780226124070 bzw. 022612407X, in Englisch, University of Chicago Press, gebraucht.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, TextbookRush [6670492], Grandview Heights, OH, U.S.A.
Ships SAME or NEXT business day. We Ship to APO/FPO addr. Choose EXPEDITED shipping and receive in 2-5 business days within the United States. See our member profile for customer support contact info. We have an easy return policy.
Ships SAME or NEXT business day. We Ship to APO/FPO addr. Choose EXPEDITED shipping and receive in 2-5 business days within the United States. See our member profile for customer support contact info. We have an easy return policy.
2
The American Warfare State, The Domestic Politics of Military Spending (2014)
EN NW EBISBN: 9780226124100 bzw. 022612410X, in Englisch, University Of Chicago Press, neu, E-Book.
Lieferung aus: Niederlande, Direct beschikbaar.
bol.com.
How is it that the United States—a country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized power—came to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets? In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and pers... How is it that the United States—a country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized power—came to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets? In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persistence of the American military complex, the growth in presidential power to launch military actions, and the decline of congressional willingness to check this power. The public costs of military mobilization and war, including the need for conscription and higher tax rates, served as political constraints on warfare for most of American history. But the vast defense industry that emerged from World War II also created new political interests that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate. Many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances or goals. At the same time, the costs of war are now borne overwhelmingly by a minority of soldiers who volunteer to fight, future generations of taxpayers, and foreign populations in whose lands wars often take place. Drawing on an impressive cache of data, Thorpe reveals how this new incentive structure has profoundly reshaped the balance of wartime powers between Congress and the president, resulting in a defense industry perennially poised for war and an executive branch that enjoys unprecedented discretion to take military action. Productinformatie:Taal: Engels;Formaat: ePub met kopieerbeveiliging (DRM) van Adobe;Kopieerrechten: Het kopiëren van (delen van) de pagina's is niet toegestaan ;Geschikt voor: Alle e-readers te koop bij bol.com (of compatible met Adobe DRM). Telefoons/tablets met Google Android (1.6 of hoger) voorzien van bol.com boekenbol app. PC en Mac met Adobe reader software;ISBN10: 022612410X;ISBN13: 9780226124100; Engels | Ebook | 2014.
bol.com.
How is it that the United States—a country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized power—came to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets? In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and pers... How is it that the United States—a country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized power—came to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets? In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persistence of the American military complex, the growth in presidential power to launch military actions, and the decline of congressional willingness to check this power. The public costs of military mobilization and war, including the need for conscription and higher tax rates, served as political constraints on warfare for most of American history. But the vast defense industry that emerged from World War II also created new political interests that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate. Many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances or goals. At the same time, the costs of war are now borne overwhelmingly by a minority of soldiers who volunteer to fight, future generations of taxpayers, and foreign populations in whose lands wars often take place. Drawing on an impressive cache of data, Thorpe reveals how this new incentive structure has profoundly reshaped the balance of wartime powers between Congress and the president, resulting in a defense industry perennially poised for war and an executive branch that enjoys unprecedented discretion to take military action. Productinformatie:Taal: Engels;Formaat: ePub met kopieerbeveiliging (DRM) van Adobe;Kopieerrechten: Het kopiëren van (delen van) de pagina's is niet toegestaan ;Geschikt voor: Alle e-readers te koop bij bol.com (of compatible met Adobe DRM). Telefoons/tablets met Google Android (1.6 of hoger) voorzien van bol.com boekenbol app. PC en Mac met Adobe reader software;ISBN10: 022612410X;ISBN13: 9780226124100; Engels | Ebook | 2014.
3
The American Warfare State, The Domestic Politics of Military Spending (2014)
EN PB NWISBN: 9780226124070 bzw. 022612407X, in Englisch, The University Of Chicago Press, Taschenbuch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Niederlande, 5-10 werkdagen.
bol.com.
How is it that the United States - a country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized power - came to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets? In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persist... How is it that the United States - a country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized power - came to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets? In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persistence of the American military complex, the growth in presidential power to launch military actions, and the decline of congressional willingness to check this power. The public costs of military mobilization and war, including the need for conscription and higher tax rates, served as political constraints on warfare for most of American history. But the vast defense industry that emerged from World War II also created new political interests that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate. Many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances or goals. At the same time, the costs of war are now borne overwhelmingly by a minority of soldiers who volunteer to fight, future generations of taxpayers, and foreign populations in whose lands wars often take place. Drawing on an impressive cache of data, Thorpe reveals how this new incentive structure has profoundly reshaped the balance of wartime powers between Congress and the president, resulting in a defense industry perennially poised for war and an executive branch that enjoys unprecedented discretion to take military action.Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 15x229x152 mm;Gewicht: 363,00 gram;Verschijningsdatum: april 2014;Druk: 1;ISBN10: 022612407X;ISBN13: 9780226124070; Engelstalig | Paperback | 2014.
bol.com.
How is it that the United States - a country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized power - came to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets? In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persist... How is it that the United States - a country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized power - came to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets? In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persistence of the American military complex, the growth in presidential power to launch military actions, and the decline of congressional willingness to check this power. The public costs of military mobilization and war, including the need for conscription and higher tax rates, served as political constraints on warfare for most of American history. But the vast defense industry that emerged from World War II also created new political interests that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate. Many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances or goals. At the same time, the costs of war are now borne overwhelmingly by a minority of soldiers who volunteer to fight, future generations of taxpayers, and foreign populations in whose lands wars often take place. Drawing on an impressive cache of data, Thorpe reveals how this new incentive structure has profoundly reshaped the balance of wartime powers between Congress and the president, resulting in a defense industry perennially poised for war and an executive branch that enjoys unprecedented discretion to take military action.Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 15x229x152 mm;Gewicht: 363,00 gram;Verschijningsdatum: april 2014;Druk: 1;ISBN10: 022612407X;ISBN13: 9780226124070; Engelstalig | Paperback | 2014.
4
The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending (Chicago Series on International and Domestic Institutions)
EN PB USISBN: 9780226124070 bzw. 022612407X, in Englisch, University Of Chicago Press, Taschenbuch, gebraucht.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Midtown Scholar Bookstore [1335784], Harrisburg, PA, U.S.A.
022612407X Bumped and creased book with tears to the extremities, but not affecting the text block and a remainder mark to one edge - Good.
022612407X Bumped and creased book with tears to the extremities, but not affecting the text block and a remainder mark to one edge - Good.
5
The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics Of Military Spending
~EN NWISBN: 9780226124070 bzw. 022612407X, vermutlich in Englisch, University of Chicago Press, Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, neu.
Lieferung aus: Kanada, Lagernd, zzgl. Versandkosten.
How is it that the United States-a country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized power-came to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets? In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persistence of the American military complex, the growth in presidential power to launch military actions, and the decline of congressional willingness to check this power. The public costs of military mobilization and war, including the need for conscription and higher tax rates, served as political constraints on warfare for most of American history. But the vast defense industry that emerged from World War II also created new political interests that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate. Many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances or goals. At the same time, the costs of war are now borne overwhelmingly by a minority of soldiers who volunteer to fight, future generations of taxpayers, and foreign populations in whose lands wars often take place. Drawing on an impressive cache of data, Thorpe reveals how this new incentive structure has profoundly reshaped the balance of wartime powers between Congress and the president, resulting in a defense industry perennially poised for war and an executive branch that enjoys unprecedented discretion to take military action.
How is it that the United States-a country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized power-came to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets? In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persistence of the American military complex, the growth in presidential power to launch military actions, and the decline of congressional willingness to check this power. The public costs of military mobilization and war, including the need for conscription and higher tax rates, served as political constraints on warfare for most of American history. But the vast defense industry that emerged from World War II also created new political interests that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate. Many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances or goals. At the same time, the costs of war are now borne overwhelmingly by a minority of soldiers who volunteer to fight, future generations of taxpayers, and foreign populations in whose lands wars often take place. Drawing on an impressive cache of data, Thorpe reveals how this new incentive structure has profoundly reshaped the balance of wartime powers between Congress and the president, resulting in a defense industry perennially poised for war and an executive branch that enjoys unprecedented discretion to take military action.
6
The American Warfare State
EN NWISBN: 9780226123912 bzw. 022612391X, in Englisch, University of Chicago Press, United States of America, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, in-stock.
How is it that the United Statesa country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized powercame to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets?In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persistence of the American military complex, the growth in presidential power to launch military actions, and the decline of congressional willingness to check this power. The public costs of military mobilization and war, including the need for conscription and higher tax rates, served as political constraints on warfare for most of American history. But the vast defense industry that emerged from World War II also created new political interests that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate. Many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances or goals. At the same time, the costs of war are now borne overwhelmingly by a minority of soldiers who volunteer to fight, future generations of taxpayers, and foreign populations in whose lands wars often take place. Drawing on an impressive cache of data, Thorpe reveals how this new incentive structure has profoundly reshaped the balance of wartime powers between Congress and the president, resulting in a defense industry perennially poised for war and an executive branch that enjoys unprecedented discretion to take military action.
How is it that the United Statesa country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized powercame to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets?In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persistence of the American military complex, the growth in presidential power to launch military actions, and the decline of congressional willingness to check this power. The public costs of military mobilization and war, including the need for conscription and higher tax rates, served as political constraints on warfare for most of American history. But the vast defense industry that emerged from World War II also created new political interests that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate. Many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances or goals. At the same time, the costs of war are now borne overwhelmingly by a minority of soldiers who volunteer to fight, future generations of taxpayers, and foreign populations in whose lands wars often take place. Drawing on an impressive cache of data, Thorpe reveals how this new incentive structure has profoundly reshaped the balance of wartime powers between Congress and the president, resulting in a defense industry perennially poised for war and an executive branch that enjoys unprecedented discretion to take military action.
7
The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending (Chicago Series on International and Domestic Institutions)
EN PB USISBN: 9780226124070 bzw. 022612407X, in Englisch, University Of Chicago Press, Taschenbuch, gebraucht.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Midtown Scholar Bookstore [1335784], Harrisburg, PA, U.S.A.
022612407X Crisp, clean, unread book with very light shelfwear and a remainder mark to one edge - GREAT.
022612407X Crisp, clean, unread book with very light shelfwear and a remainder mark to one edge - GREAT.
9
The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending
EN HC NWISBN: 9780226123912 bzw. 022612391X, in Englisch, University of Chicago Press, gebundenes Buch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, In Stock.
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
Lade…