Von dem Buch Understanding Intelligence Failure : Warning, Response and Deterrence haben wir 4 gleiche oder sehr ähnliche Ausgaben identifiziert!
Falls Sie nur an einem bestimmten Exempar interessiert sind, können Sie aus der folgenden Liste jenes wählen, an dem Sie interessiert sind:
100%: Jean Piaget: Understanding Intelligence Failure : Warning, Response and Deterrence (ISBN: 9781317375739) Taylor and Francis, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
100%: James J. Wirtz: Understanding Intelligence Failure : Warning, Response and Deterrence (ISBN: 9781317375722) 2016, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
100%: Jacques Ranciere: Understanding Intelligence Failure : Warning, Response and Deterrence (ISBN: 9781138942141) in Englisch, Taschenbuch.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
100%: Wirtz, James J.: Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response And Deterrence (ISBN: 9781138942134) Taylor & Francis Ltd, in Englisch, Broschiert.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
Understanding Intelligence Failure : Warning, Response and Deterrence
11 Angebote vergleichen
Bester Preis: € 29,30 (vom 17.10.2017)1
Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response And Deterrence
EN NWISBN: 9781138942141 bzw. 1138942146, in Englisch, Taylor and Francis, neu.
Lieferung aus: Kanada, In Stock, plus shipping.
James J. Wirtz, Books, Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response And Deterrence, This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist?s view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
James J. Wirtz, Books, Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response And Deterrence, This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist?s view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
2
Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response And Deterrence
EN NWISBN: 9781138942134 bzw. 1138942138, in Englisch, Taylor and Francis, neu.
Lieferung aus: Kanada, In Stock, plus shipping.
James J. Wirtz, Books, Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response And Deterrence, This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist?s view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
James J. Wirtz, Books, Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response And Deterrence, This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist?s view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
3
Understanding Intelligence Failure
EN NW EBISBN: 9781138942134 bzw. 1138942138, in Englisch, Taylor and Francis, neu, E-Book.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Ebook for download.
History, This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist's view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general. eBook.
History, This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist's view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general. eBook.
4
Understanding Intelligence Failure
EN NWISBN: 9781138942134 bzw. 1138942138, in Englisch, Taylor & Francis Ltd, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, in-stock.
This volume comprises a selection of essays by Prof. James Wirtz on the theory of surprise in intelligence studies. The theory of surprise offers an explanation for why weak parties in a nascent conflict are attracted to the prospect of confronting stronger opponents with a fait accompli to achieve strategic objectives that they cannot realistically expect to achieve through attritional engagements. It also explains why stronger parties are likely to be surprised by these initiatives. It links a structural explanation for surprise (the military imbalance in a conflict diad), with differences in perceptual frameworks that create the strategic, bureaucratic and cognitive conditions for surprise to occur. The parts of the volume explore various ramifications of the theory outlined in Chapter 1. In PART I, the theory of surprise is used to generate insights into the way various state and non-state actors utilize surprise to obtain strategic objectives. This section contains material that explores 9/11, Pearl Harbor, the Kargil crisis, and the way non-state actors rely on strategic surprise as a key operational enabler. In PART II, the theory of surprise is used to explain why deterrence failure occurs in situations where strong actors are attempting to deter weaker opponents, while also identifying policy and operationally relevant indicators of impending deterrence failure. In other words, this section expands on the theory by exploring its relevance to the theory and practice of deterrence. PART III describes various ways to minimize or block the pathways to strategic surprise and deterrence failure identified by the theory of surprise. Bringing these previously published articles and book chapters together in a single volume, makes it possible to draw the reader's attention to the theoretical and practical connections between strategic surprise and deterrence failure, and to introduce practical techniques for avoiding.
This volume comprises a selection of essays by Prof. James Wirtz on the theory of surprise in intelligence studies. The theory of surprise offers an explanation for why weak parties in a nascent conflict are attracted to the prospect of confronting stronger opponents with a fait accompli to achieve strategic objectives that they cannot realistically expect to achieve through attritional engagements. It also explains why stronger parties are likely to be surprised by these initiatives. It links a structural explanation for surprise (the military imbalance in a conflict diad), with differences in perceptual frameworks that create the strategic, bureaucratic and cognitive conditions for surprise to occur. The parts of the volume explore various ramifications of the theory outlined in Chapter 1. In PART I, the theory of surprise is used to generate insights into the way various state and non-state actors utilize surprise to obtain strategic objectives. This section contains material that explores 9/11, Pearl Harbor, the Kargil crisis, and the way non-state actors rely on strategic surprise as a key operational enabler. In PART II, the theory of surprise is used to explain why deterrence failure occurs in situations where strong actors are attempting to deter weaker opponents, while also identifying policy and operationally relevant indicators of impending deterrence failure. In other words, this section expands on the theory by exploring its relevance to the theory and practice of deterrence. PART III describes various ways to minimize or block the pathways to strategic surprise and deterrence failure identified by the theory of surprise. Bringing these previously published articles and book chapters together in a single volume, makes it possible to draw the reader's attention to the theoretical and practical connections between strategic surprise and deterrence failure, and to introduce practical techniques for avoiding.
5
Understanding Intelligence Failure (2016)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781317375722 bzw. 1317375726, in Englisch, Routledge, Routledge, Routledge, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, in-stock.
This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist's view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist's view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
6
Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response and Deterrence
EN NW EBISBN: 9781317375722 bzw. 1317375726, in Englisch, Taylor & Francis, neu, E-Book.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, In Stock.
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
7
Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response and Deterrence
EN PB NWISBN: 9781138942141 bzw. 1138942146, in Englisch, Taylor & Francis, Taschenbuch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, In Stock.
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
8
Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response and Deterrence
EN HC NWISBN: 9781138942134 bzw. 1138942138, in Englisch, Taylor & Francis, gebundenes Buch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, In Stock.
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
10
Lade…