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Conceptual Flux: Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change (Studies in Cognitive Systems)100%: M. Perlman: Conceptual Flux: Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change (Studies in Cognitive Systems) (ISBN: 9789048154159) 2010, Springer, in Englisch, Taschenbuch.
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Conceptual Flux - Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, Concept Change (STUDIES IN COGNITIVE SYSTEMS Volume 24)58%: Perlman, Mark and Perlman, M.: Conceptual Flux - Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, Concept Change (STUDIES IN COGNITIVE SYSTEMS Volume 24) (ISBN: 9780792362159) 2000, 2000. Ausgabe, in Englisch, Broschiert.
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Conceptual Flux: Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change (Studies in Cognitive Systems)
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9789048154159 - M. Perlman: Conceptual Flux, Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change
M. Perlman

Conceptual Flux, Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change (2010)

Lieferung erfolgt aus/von: Niederlande NL PB NW

ISBN: 9789048154159 bzw. 9048154154, in Holländisch, Springer, Taschenbuch, neu.

Lieferung aus: Niederlande, Vermoedelijk 4-6 weken.
bol.com.
How can one think about a thing, think something false about it, and still be thinking about that thing at all? If a concept is applied to something outside its meaning, how are we to say it does not mean that thing as well? The problem of misrepresentation is one of the central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here, Mark Perlman criticizes the way all contemporary theories of mental representation seek to account for misrepresentation, concluding that it cannot be explained naturistic... How can one think about a thing, think something false about it, and still be thinking about that thing at all? If a concept is applied to something outside its meaning, how are we to say it does not mean that thing as well? The problem of misrepresentation is one of the central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here, Mark Perlman criticizes the way all contemporary theories of mental representation seek to account for misrepresentation, concluding that it cannot be explained naturistically. Specifically, Perlman evaluates and criticizes the theories of mental content proposed by Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, Block, Harman and others, as well as examining verificationist approaches to meaning of Quine, Davidson and Stich. The book goes much further than criticism, however: Perlman formulates a naturalistic theory of representation that reluctantly accepts the unfortunate conclusion that there is no misrepresentation. He adds a pragmatic theory of content, which explains apparent misrepresentation as concept change. Mental representations can be good or bad in specific contexts and for specific purposes, but their correctness is not a matter of truth and falsity. The pragmatic approach to mental content has implications for epistemology, theories of truth, metaphysics, psychology, and AI (specifically connectionist networks). Readership: One of the most thorough examinations of mental representation and meaning holism available, this book should be read by everyone interested in the mind and how ideas can have meaning. It crosses boundaries from philosophy into psychology, linguistics, AI and cognitive science.Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 23x234x156 mm;Gewicht: 706,00 gram;Verschijningsdatum: december 2010;ISBN10: 9048154154;ISBN13: 9789048154159; Engelstalig | Paperback | 2010.
2
9789048154159 - M. Perlman: Conceptual Flux: Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change (Studies in Cognitive Systems)
M. Perlman

Conceptual Flux: Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change (Studies in Cognitive Systems) (2010)

Lieferung erfolgt aus/von: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland EN PB NW

ISBN: 9789048154159 bzw. 9048154154, in Englisch, 464 Seiten, Springer, Taschenbuch, neu.

193,92 (£ 168,03)¹
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Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, Usually dispatched within 1-2 business days, exclusief verzendkosten (indien geleverd).
Von Händler/Antiquariat, BOOKS etc.
How can one think about a thing, think something false about it, and still be thinking about that thing at all? If a concept is applied to something outside its meaning, how are we to say it does not mean that thing as well? The problem of misrepresentation is one of the central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here, Mark Perlman criticizes the way all contemporary theories of mental representation seek to account for misrepresentation, concluding that it cannot be explained naturistically. Specifically, Perlman evaluates and criticizes the theories of mental content proposed by Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, Block, Harman and others, as well as examining verificationist approaches to meaning of Quine, Davidson and Stich. The book goes much further than criticism, however: Perlman formulates a naturalistic theory of representation that reluctantly accepts the unfortunate conclusion that there is no misrepresentation. He adds a pragmatic theory of content, which explains apparent misrepresentation as concept change. Mental representations can be good or bad in specific contexts and for specific purposes, but their correctness is not a matter of truth and falsity. The pragmatic approach to mental content has implications for epistemology, theories of truth, metaphysics, psychology, and AI (specifically connectionist networks). Readership: One of the most thorough examinations of mental representation and meaning holism available, this book should be read by everyone interested in the mind and how ideas can have meaning. It crosses boundaries from philosophy into psychology, linguistics, AI and cognitive science. Paperback, Editie: Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2000, Label: Springer, Springer, Productgroep: Book, Gepubliceerd: 2010-12-07, Releasedatum: 2010-12-07, Studio: Springer, Verkoop rang: 5820117.
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9789048154159 - M. Perlman: Conceptual Flux: Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change (Studies in Cognitive Systems)
M. Perlman

Conceptual Flux: Mental Representation, Misrepresentation, and Concept Change (Studies in Cognitive Systems) (2010)

Lieferung erfolgt aus/von: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland EN PB US

ISBN: 9789048154159 bzw. 9048154154, in Englisch, 464 Seiten, Springer, Taschenbuch, gebraucht.

222,80 (£ 193,05)¹
unverbindlich
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, Usually dispatched within 1-2 business days, exclusief verzendkosten (indien geleverd).
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Herb Tandree Philosophy Books.
How can one think about a thing, think something false about it, and still be thinking about that thing at all? If a concept is applied to something outside its meaning, how are we to say it does not mean that thing as well? The problem of misrepresentation is one of the central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here, Mark Perlman criticizes the way all contemporary theories of mental representation seek to account for misrepresentation, concluding that it cannot be explained naturistically. Specifically, Perlman evaluates and criticizes the theories of mental content proposed by Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, Block, Harman and others, as well as examining verificationist approaches to meaning of Quine, Davidson and Stich. The book goes much further than criticism, however: Perlman formulates a naturalistic theory of representation that reluctantly accepts the unfortunate conclusion that there is no misrepresentation. He adds a pragmatic theory of content, which explains apparent misrepresentation as concept change. Mental representations can be good or bad in specific contexts and for specific purposes, but their correctness is not a matter of truth and falsity. The pragmatic approach to mental content has implications for epistemology, theories of truth, metaphysics, psychology, and AI (specifically connectionist networks). Readership: One of the most thorough examinations of mental representation and meaning holism available, this book should be read by everyone interested in the mind and how ideas can have meaning. It crosses boundaries from philosophy into psychology, linguistics, AI and cognitive science. Paperback, Editie: Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2000, Label: Springer, Springer, Productgroep: Book, Gepubliceerd: 2010-12-07, Releasedatum: 2010-12-07, Studio: Springer, Verkoop rang: 5820117.
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