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100%: B. C. Postow: Reasons For Action: Toward a Normative Theory and Meta-Level Criteria (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy) (ISBN: 9789048152193) 2010, Springer, in Englisch, Taschenbuch.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
64%: B. C. Postow, Govert A. den Hartogh (Editor): Reasons for Action: Toward Normative T: Toward Normative Theory and Meta-level Criteria (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy) (ISBN: 9780792357001) 1999, in Englisch, Broschiert.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
Reasons For Action: Toward a Normative Theory and Meta-Level Criteria (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy)
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Bester Preis: € 159,59 (vom 04.06.2016)1
Reasons for Action (2010)
NL PB NWISBN: 9789048152193 bzw. 9048152194, in Holländisch, Springer, Taschenbuch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Niederlande, 3-4 weken.
bol.com.
2 first-person point of view, I acknowledge these possible handicaps and try to overcome them. Other people may coherently judge that I am incapable of figuring out correctly what I rationally ought to do, or they may inform me of reasons of which I had heretofore been ignorant, or they may try to help me overcome intellectual hindrances. Like me, these people would be assuming that the goal is to identify what I really rationally ought to do. Nevertheless, we are concerned with reasons for the ... 2 first-person point of view, I acknowledge these possible handicaps and try to overcome them. Other people may coherently judge that I am incapable of figuring out correctly what I rationally ought to do, or they may inform me of reasons of which I had heretofore been ignorant, or they may try to help me overcome intellectual hindrances. Like me, these people would be assuming that the goal is to identify what I really rationally ought to do. Nevertheless, we are concerned with reasons for the agent to act in a certain way, rather than with reasons, say, for someone to want it to be the case that the agent act. Thus to be a reason in our sense is to be a consideration which has an appropriate guiding role to play in the. agents deliberation. (An agent is guided by reasons if she determines what to do in light of the reasons. ) Suppose then that a nor- mative theory says that it is supremely desirable, or that it rationally ought to be the case, that agents act in a way that maximizes the general utility, but that (since the general utility is never in fact maximized by those who pay attention to it) considerations of the general utility should play no role in the agents' deliberation. Such a theory would not be said to ascribe to agents a reason to maximize the general utility on our usage. Productinformatie:Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 11x234x156 mm;Gewicht: 310,00 gram;ISBN10: 9048152194;ISBN13: 9789048152193; Engels | Paperback | 2010.
bol.com.
2 first-person point of view, I acknowledge these possible handicaps and try to overcome them. Other people may coherently judge that I am incapable of figuring out correctly what I rationally ought to do, or they may inform me of reasons of which I had heretofore been ignorant, or they may try to help me overcome intellectual hindrances. Like me, these people would be assuming that the goal is to identify what I really rationally ought to do. Nevertheless, we are concerned with reasons for the ... 2 first-person point of view, I acknowledge these possible handicaps and try to overcome them. Other people may coherently judge that I am incapable of figuring out correctly what I rationally ought to do, or they may inform me of reasons of which I had heretofore been ignorant, or they may try to help me overcome intellectual hindrances. Like me, these people would be assuming that the goal is to identify what I really rationally ought to do. Nevertheless, we are concerned with reasons for the agent to act in a certain way, rather than with reasons, say, for someone to want it to be the case that the agent act. Thus to be a reason in our sense is to be a consideration which has an appropriate guiding role to play in the. agents deliberation. (An agent is guided by reasons if she determines what to do in light of the reasons. ) Suppose then that a nor- mative theory says that it is supremely desirable, or that it rationally ought to be the case, that agents act in a way that maximizes the general utility, but that (since the general utility is never in fact maximized by those who pay attention to it) considerations of the general utility should play no role in the agents' deliberation. Such a theory would not be said to ascribe to agents a reason to maximize the general utility on our usage. Productinformatie:Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 11x234x156 mm;Gewicht: 310,00 gram;ISBN10: 9048152194;ISBN13: 9789048152193; Engels | Paperback | 2010.
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Reasons For Action: Toward a Normative Theory and Meta-Level Criteria (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy) (2010)
EN PB USISBN: 9789048152193 bzw. 9048152194, in Englisch, 216 Seiten, Springer, Taschenbuch, gebraucht.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, Usually dispatched within 1-2 business days.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Herb Tandree Philosophy Books.
What, ultimately, is there good reason to do? This book proposes a unified theory of agent-dependent reasons and agent-independent reasons. It holds that principles which assign reasons to agents are valid if and only if they make maximally good sense in the light of relevant data and background theories. The theory avoids problems encountered by views associated with Nagel, Parfit, Brandt, Hubin, Gert, Baier, and Tiberius, amongst others. By what criteria should a normative theory of ultimate reasons be judged? Plausible meta-level criteria emerge from a process of identifying the criteria that have been used, sometimes unwittingly, by various theorists; categorizing and evaluating the criteria in the light of each other; and proposing revisions on that basis. This method escapes the drawbacks of rival approaches, such as those associated with Parfit, Gert, and Darwall. The resulting criteria cast a favorable light on the proposed normative theory of ultimate reasons. Paperback, Ausgabe: Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 1999, Label: Springer, Springer, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2010-12-07, Freigegeben: 2010-12-07, Studio: Springer.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, Herb Tandree Philosophy Books.
What, ultimately, is there good reason to do? This book proposes a unified theory of agent-dependent reasons and agent-independent reasons. It holds that principles which assign reasons to agents are valid if and only if they make maximally good sense in the light of relevant data and background theories. The theory avoids problems encountered by views associated with Nagel, Parfit, Brandt, Hubin, Gert, Baier, and Tiberius, amongst others. By what criteria should a normative theory of ultimate reasons be judged? Plausible meta-level criteria emerge from a process of identifying the criteria that have been used, sometimes unwittingly, by various theorists; categorizing and evaluating the criteria in the light of each other; and proposing revisions on that basis. This method escapes the drawbacks of rival approaches, such as those associated with Parfit, Gert, and Darwall. The resulting criteria cast a favorable light on the proposed normative theory of ultimate reasons. Paperback, Ausgabe: Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 1999, Label: Springer, Springer, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2010-12-07, Freigegeben: 2010-12-07, Studio: Springer.
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Reasons For Action: Toward a Normative Theory and Meta-Level Criteria (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy) (2010)
EN PB NWISBN: 9789048152193 bzw. 9048152194, in Englisch, 216 Seiten, Springer, Taschenbuch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, Usually dispatched within 1-2 business days.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, BOOKS etc.
What, ultimately, is there good reason to do? This book proposes a unified theory of agent-dependent reasons and agent-independent reasons. It holds that principles which assign reasons to agents are valid if and only if they make maximally good sense in the light of relevant data and background theories. The theory avoids problems encountered by views associated with Nagel, Parfit, Brandt, Hubin, Gert, Baier, and Tiberius, amongst others. By what criteria should a normative theory of ultimate reasons be judged? Plausible meta-level criteria emerge from a process of identifying the criteria that have been used, sometimes unwittingly, by various theorists; categorizing and evaluating the criteria in the light of each other; and proposing revisions on that basis. This method escapes the drawbacks of rival approaches, such as those associated with Parfit, Gert, and Darwall. The resulting criteria cast a favorable light on the proposed normative theory of ultimate reasons. Paperback, Ausgabe: Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 1999, Label: Springer, Springer, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2010-12-07, Freigegeben: 2010-12-07, Studio: Springer.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, BOOKS etc.
What, ultimately, is there good reason to do? This book proposes a unified theory of agent-dependent reasons and agent-independent reasons. It holds that principles which assign reasons to agents are valid if and only if they make maximally good sense in the light of relevant data and background theories. The theory avoids problems encountered by views associated with Nagel, Parfit, Brandt, Hubin, Gert, Baier, and Tiberius, amongst others. By what criteria should a normative theory of ultimate reasons be judged? Plausible meta-level criteria emerge from a process of identifying the criteria that have been used, sometimes unwittingly, by various theorists; categorizing and evaluating the criteria in the light of each other; and proposing revisions on that basis. This method escapes the drawbacks of rival approaches, such as those associated with Parfit, Gert, and Darwall. The resulting criteria cast a favorable light on the proposed normative theory of ultimate reasons. Paperback, Ausgabe: Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 1999, Label: Springer, Springer, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2010-12-07, Freigegeben: 2010-12-07, Studio: Springer.
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