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100%: J Christopher Maloney: What It Is Like to Perceive (ISBN: 9783110540796) de Gruyter, in Deutsch.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
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Bester Preis: € 119,96 (vom 01.04.2017)1
What It Is Like To Perceive : Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9780190854768 bzw. 0190854766, in Englisch, Oxford University Press, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, Despatched same working day before 3pm.
Naturalistic cognitive science, when realistically rendered, rightly maintains that to think is to deploy contentful mental representations. Accordingly, conscious perception, memory, and anticipation are forms of cognition that, despite their introspectively manifest differences, may coincide in content. Sometimes we remember what we saw; other times we predict what we will see.Why, then, does what it is like consciously to perceive, differ so dramatically from what it is like merely to recall or anticipate the same? Why, if thought is just representation, does the phenomenal character of seeing a sunset differ so stunningly from the tepid character of recollecting or predicting the sun's descent?J.Christopher Maloney argues that, unlike other cognitive modes, perception is in fact immediate, direct acquaintance with the object of thought. Although all mental representations carry content, the vehicles of perceptual representation are uniquely composed of the very objects represented. To perceive the setting sun is to use the sun and its properties to cast a peculiar cognitive vehicle of demonstrative representation. This vehicle's embedded referential term is identical with, and demonstrates, the sun itself. And the vehicle's self-attributive demonstrative predicate is itself forged from a property of that same remote star.So, in this sense, the perceiving mind is an extended mind. Perception is unbrokered cognition of what is real, exactly as it really is. Maloney's theory of perception will be of great interest in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
Naturalistic cognitive science, when realistically rendered, rightly maintains that to think is to deploy contentful mental representations. Accordingly, conscious perception, memory, and anticipation are forms of cognition that, despite their introspectively manifest differences, may coincide in content. Sometimes we remember what we saw; other times we predict what we will see.Why, then, does what it is like consciously to perceive, differ so dramatically from what it is like merely to recall or anticipate the same? Why, if thought is just representation, does the phenomenal character of seeing a sunset differ so stunningly from the tepid character of recollecting or predicting the sun's descent?J.Christopher Maloney argues that, unlike other cognitive modes, perception is in fact immediate, direct acquaintance with the object of thought. Although all mental representations carry content, the vehicles of perceptual representation are uniquely composed of the very objects represented. To perceive the setting sun is to use the sun and its properties to cast a peculiar cognitive vehicle of demonstrative representation. This vehicle's embedded referential term is identical with, and demonstrates, the sun itself. And the vehicle's self-attributive demonstrative predicate is itself forged from a property of that same remote star.So, in this sense, the perceiving mind is an extended mind. Perception is unbrokered cognition of what is real, exactly as it really is. Maloney's theory of perception will be of great interest in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
2
What It Is Like To Perceive : Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9780190854775 bzw. 0190854774, in Englisch, Oxford University Press, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, Despatched same working day before 3pm.
Naturalistic cognitive science, when realistically rendered, rightly maintains that to think is to deploy contentful mental representations. Accordingly, conscious perception, memory, and anticipation are forms of cognition that, despite their introspectively manifest differences, may coincide in content. Sometimes we remember what we saw; other times we predict what we will see.Why, then, does what it is like consciously to perceive, differ so dramatically from what it is like merely to recall or anticipate the same? Why, if thought is just representation, does the phenomenal character of seeing a sunset differ so stunningly from the tepid character of recollecting or predicting the sun's descent?J.Christopher Maloney argues that, unlike other cognitive modes, perception is in fact immediate, direct acquaintance with the object of thought. Although all mental representations carry content, the vehicles of perceptual representation are uniquely composed of the very objects represented. To perceive the setting sun is to use the sun and its properties to cast a peculiar cognitive vehicle of demonstrative representation. This vehicle's embedded referential term is identical with, and demonstrates, the sun itself. And the vehicle's self-attributive demonstrative predicate is itself forged from a property of that same remote star.So, in this sense, the perceiving mind is an extended mind. Perception is unbrokered cognition of what is real, exactly as it really is. Maloney's theory of perception will be of great interest in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
Naturalistic cognitive science, when realistically rendered, rightly maintains that to think is to deploy contentful mental representations. Accordingly, conscious perception, memory, and anticipation are forms of cognition that, despite their introspectively manifest differences, may coincide in content. Sometimes we remember what we saw; other times we predict what we will see.Why, then, does what it is like consciously to perceive, differ so dramatically from what it is like merely to recall or anticipate the same? Why, if thought is just representation, does the phenomenal character of seeing a sunset differ so stunningly from the tepid character of recollecting or predicting the sun's descent?J.Christopher Maloney argues that, unlike other cognitive modes, perception is in fact immediate, direct acquaintance with the object of thought. Although all mental representations carry content, the vehicles of perceptual representation are uniquely composed of the very objects represented. To perceive the setting sun is to use the sun and its properties to cast a peculiar cognitive vehicle of demonstrative representation. This vehicle's embedded referential term is identical with, and demonstrates, the sun itself. And the vehicle's self-attributive demonstrative predicate is itself forged from a property of that same remote star.So, in this sense, the perceiving mind is an extended mind. Perception is unbrokered cognition of what is real, exactly as it really is. Maloney's theory of perception will be of great interest in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
3
What It Is Like To Perceive - Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9780190854775 bzw. 0190854774, in Englisch, Oxford University Press, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Free shipping.
What It Is Like To Perceive: Naturalistic cognitive science, when realistically rendered, rightly maintains that to think is to deploy contentful mental representations. Accordingly, conscious perception, memory, and anticipation are forms of cognition that, despite their introspectively manifest differences, may coincide in content. Sometimes we remember what we saw other times we predict what we will see. Why, then, does what it is like consciously to perceive, differ so dramatically from what it is like merely to recall or anticipate the same Why, if thought is just representation, does the phenomenal character of seeing a sunset differ so stunningly from the tepid character of recollecting or predicting the sun`s descent J. Christopher Maloney argues that, unlike other cognitive modes, perception is in fact immediate, direct acquaintance with the object of thought. Although all mental representations carry content, the vehicles of perceptual representation are uniquely composed of the very objects represented. To perceive the setting sun is to use the sun and its properties to cast a peculiar cognitive vehicle of demonstrative representation. This vehicle`s embedded referential term is identical with, and demonstrates, the sun itself. And the vehicle`s self-attributive demonstrative predicate is itself forged from a property of that same remote star. So, in this sense, the perceiving mind is an extended mind. Perception is unbrokered cognition of what is real, exactly as it really is. Maloney`s theory of perception will be of great interest in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Englisch, Ebook.
What It Is Like To Perceive: Naturalistic cognitive science, when realistically rendered, rightly maintains that to think is to deploy contentful mental representations. Accordingly, conscious perception, memory, and anticipation are forms of cognition that, despite their introspectively manifest differences, may coincide in content. Sometimes we remember what we saw other times we predict what we will see. Why, then, does what it is like consciously to perceive, differ so dramatically from what it is like merely to recall or anticipate the same Why, if thought is just representation, does the phenomenal character of seeing a sunset differ so stunningly from the tepid character of recollecting or predicting the sun`s descent J. Christopher Maloney argues that, unlike other cognitive modes, perception is in fact immediate, direct acquaintance with the object of thought. Although all mental representations carry content, the vehicles of perceptual representation are uniquely composed of the very objects represented. To perceive the setting sun is to use the sun and its properties to cast a peculiar cognitive vehicle of demonstrative representation. This vehicle`s embedded referential term is identical with, and demonstrates, the sun itself. And the vehicle`s self-attributive demonstrative predicate is itself forged from a property of that same remote star. So, in this sense, the perceiving mind is an extended mind. Perception is unbrokered cognition of what is real, exactly as it really is. Maloney`s theory of perception will be of great interest in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Englisch, Ebook.
4
What It Is Like To Perceive
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9780190854775 bzw. 0190854774, in Englisch, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
What It Is Like To Perceive ab 40.49 EURO Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception.
5
What It Is Like To Perceive
DE NW EBISBN: 9780190854775 bzw. 0190854774, in Deutsch, Oxford University Press, neu, E-Book.
Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Versandkostenfrei, In stock (Download).
What It Is Like To Perceive ab 67.49 € als epub eBook: Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception. Aus dem Bereich: eBooks, Belletristik, Erzählungen,.
What It Is Like To Perceive ab 67.49 € als epub eBook: Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception. Aus dem Bereich: eBooks, Belletristik, Erzählungen,.
6
What It Is Like To Perceive: Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception
EN NW EBISBN: 9780190854775 bzw. 0190854774, in Englisch, Oxford University Press, neu, E-Book.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, In Stock.
What-It-Is-Like-To-Perceive~~J-Christopher-Maloney, What It Is Like To Perceive: Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception, NOOK Book (eBook).
What-It-Is-Like-To-Perceive~~J-Christopher-Maloney, What It Is Like To Perceive: Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception, NOOK Book (eBook).
7
What It Is Like To Perceive
DE NW EBISBN: 9780190854775 bzw. 0190854774, in Deutsch, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, neu, E-Book.
Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Versandkostenfrei, in stock.
What It Is Like To Perceive - Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception: ab 67.99 €.
What It Is Like To Perceive - Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception: ab 67.99 €.
8
What It Is Like to Perceive
DE NWISBN: 9783110540796 bzw. 3110540797, in Deutsch, de Gruyter, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigtes Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, in-stock.
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
9
What It Is Like To Perceive
EN NW EBISBN: 9780190854768 bzw. 0190854766, in Englisch, Oxford University Press, neu, E-Book.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Ebook for download.
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
Die Beschreibung dieses Angebotes ist von geringer Qualität oder in einer Fremdsprache. Trotzdem anzeigen
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